From medieval rivalry to the Pax Democratica: why Europe’s unique political ecology was always destined for integration, and why it must now defend that legacy alone
Thank you, Claire!. Your concern is better addressed in the next article.
Still, a short answer: when Europeans democratically agree that some part of State action is mostly non political, often it is either taken (monetary policy) or harmonized at the European level.
This is very useful, and has been sucessful. It makes Europe both a real political structure, but not a country. We shall defend it, first of all by understading its limits.
Arturo, gracias for this "A short history of Europe" text with important reflections and historical moments. Have you read or are you familiar with Ulrich Beck's ideas and arguments in "Cosmopolitan Europe"? It is about both the EU's development as well as the EU in relation to our world in general.
Well I am not sure is so much history: in this and the next article, the real background is an alternative to "nationalist" realism (vg. Mearsheimer) in name of "institutional" realism. See this recension of "the Dictator's Handbook" by Bueno de Mesquita:
The three articles of "Post American Europe" are now available:
In the first article, I examine the historical roots of the European Union (EU): Europe was an ecology of competing, often warring jurisdictions that, after the Second World War, were integrated into the American Pax Democratica. Our generational challenge is to maintain the greatest American legacy: the EU.
In the second article, the complex governance of the EU is characterised as a nomocracy, a harmonising and consociational confederacy which is less efficient but more robust than the other large international actors. Minimalistic institutional reform is proposed to strengthen European democracies in the age of populism.
The final instalment proposes policies to address technological dependency and the foreign policy stance of the post-American Europe: technological sovereignty, competition reform, and a renewed liberal order in Europe's near abroad:
The EU's estimated Total Fertility Rate (TFR) for 2025 stands at approximately 1.30. Only South Korea (1.09) and China (1.0) are lower—both exhibiting even more extreme signs of demographic collapse. However, it's worth noting that European figures often fail to differentiate between native and non-native births, which may obscure the full picture of population replacement dynamics.
This raises a fundamental question: How can Europe endure without Europeans? For many neoclassical rationalists—who conceive of humans as interchangeable economic units—this is not even a valid question. But for those who take seriously the implications of human biological diversity and the long arc of gene-culture coevolution, it is a central and urgent issue.
I remain fully supportive of European integration as a civilizational project. But integration presupposes continuity—something to integrate. If current trends continue unchallenged, we may face not merely a post-American world, but a post-European Europe.
This shows that the problem is not specially European, while Europe is a difficult position because it has suffered it for longer than most places. My only comment here is this: the weaker we are in any dimension (economic, demographic, etc), the more reasons we have to be as united as possible.
BirthGauge and others have made a strong case that official fertility estimates are significantly understated. In reality, the average European TFR may already be at or below 1.0—a level that implies demographic freefall. While fertility decline is now a global trend (with sub-Saharan Africa as a notable exception), some regions are clearly more affected than others—and Europe is at the epicenter.
But this is not just a matter of Europe having led the demographic transition. That framing suggests a neutral or natural process. In truth, multiple generations of Europeans—and, for different cultural and historical reasons, many Southeast Asians—have been actively conditioned to adopt anti-natalist values. In Europe, this extends to the denial of ethnic continuity itself: the widespread idea that there is no such thing as European autochthony.
This mindset must change. There is overwhelming evidence that mass non-European immigration is not a solution to the crisis—it may in fact deepen it. But to change course, we must confront and overturn some of the core assumptions held by European elites: the belief in universal human fungibility, the myth of purely economic rationality, and the notion that civilization can persist without continuity of its people.
Because in the end, there will be nothing left to integrate if there are no Europeans left to be integrated and united.
Below there are the other two parts of this essay; first of all, Europe is not a country and the Comission is not a government. The EU is a platform to run mostly tecnhnical consensual policies. Additionally, given out parlamentary sistems, the New Rigth already influences and will never rule Europe.
Finally, our Muslim population is smaller than that of Russia and Israel, and fertility rates show that everybody everywhere (Muslim countries too) is westernizing, perhaps even too much.
Yout comment looks like antisemitic disinformation. More likely wrote from Teherán (perhaps Moscow) than from Tel Aviv. You foul nobody here. The Muslim fertility-Mein Kampf comment is totally anti kosher.
Very interesting. I've cross-posted it. I wonder if you share the concern I raised: the EU's lack of a stable center of legitimate power.
Thank you, Claire!. Your concern is better addressed in the next article.
Still, a short answer: when Europeans democratically agree that some part of State action is mostly non political, often it is either taken (monetary policy) or harmonized at the European level.
This is very useful, and has been sucessful. It makes Europe both a real political structure, but not a country. We shall defend it, first of all by understading its limits.
Arturo, gracias for this "A short history of Europe" text with important reflections and historical moments. Have you read or are you familiar with Ulrich Beck's ideas and arguments in "Cosmopolitan Europe"? It is about both the EU's development as well as the EU in relation to our world in general.
Well I am not sure is so much history: in this and the next article, the real background is an alternative to "nationalist" realism (vg. Mearsheimer) in name of "institutional" realism. See this recension of "the Dictator's Handbook" by Bueno de Mesquita:
https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/kBLJgARsfXW5xYLtj/the-dictator-s-handbook-book-by-bruce-bueno-de-mesquita-and
This is (in my view) the "real realism".
Regarding Beck, I did not know about him, and I will read this short and free article (before decding about the long book):
https://www.iemed.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/QM10_Ulrich_Beck_en.pdf
Thank you for your interesting comment!
Thank you as well :)
The three articles of "Post American Europe" are now available:
In the first article, I examine the historical roots of the European Union (EU): Europe was an ecology of competing, often warring jurisdictions that, after the Second World War, were integrated into the American Pax Democratica. Our generational challenge is to maintain the greatest American legacy: the EU.
https://www.frenchdispatch.eu/p/post-american-europe-historical-roots-eu-integration?r=biy76&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=false
In the second article, the complex governance of the EU is characterised as a nomocracy, a harmonising and consociational confederacy which is less efficient but more robust than the other large international actors. Minimalistic institutional reform is proposed to strengthen European democracies in the age of populism.
https://www.frenchdispatch.eu/p/post-american-europe-eu-rule-based-democracy-authoritarianism?r=biy76&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=false
The final instalment proposes policies to address technological dependency and the foreign policy stance of the post-American Europe: technological sovereignty, competition reform, and a renewed liberal order in Europe's near abroad:
https://www.frenchdispatch.eu/p/post-american-europe-eu-technological-sovereignty-liberal-order?r=biy76&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=false
The EU's estimated Total Fertility Rate (TFR) for 2025 stands at approximately 1.30. Only South Korea (1.09) and China (1.0) are lower—both exhibiting even more extreme signs of demographic collapse. However, it's worth noting that European figures often fail to differentiate between native and non-native births, which may obscure the full picture of population replacement dynamics.
This raises a fundamental question: How can Europe endure without Europeans? For many neoclassical rationalists—who conceive of humans as interchangeable economic units—this is not even a valid question. But for those who take seriously the implications of human biological diversity and the long arc of gene-culture coevolution, it is a central and urgent issue.
I remain fully supportive of European integration as a civilizational project. But integration presupposes continuity—something to integrate. If current trends continue unchallenged, we may face not merely a post-American world, but a post-European Europe.
Eurostat put the EU tfr in 1.38:
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Fertility_statistics
While in Turkey is 1.48:
https://nordicmonitor.com/2025/05/turkey-sounds-alarm-over-declining-birth-rates-amid-economic-concerns/
This shows that the problem is not specially European, while Europe is a difficult position because it has suffered it for longer than most places. My only comment here is this: the weaker we are in any dimension (economic, demographic, etc), the more reasons we have to be as united as possible.
BirthGauge and others have made a strong case that official fertility estimates are significantly understated. In reality, the average European TFR may already be at or below 1.0—a level that implies demographic freefall. While fertility decline is now a global trend (with sub-Saharan Africa as a notable exception), some regions are clearly more affected than others—and Europe is at the epicenter.
But this is not just a matter of Europe having led the demographic transition. That framing suggests a neutral or natural process. In truth, multiple generations of Europeans—and, for different cultural and historical reasons, many Southeast Asians—have been actively conditioned to adopt anti-natalist values. In Europe, this extends to the denial of ethnic continuity itself: the widespread idea that there is no such thing as European autochthony.
This mindset must change. There is overwhelming evidence that mass non-European immigration is not a solution to the crisis—it may in fact deepen it. But to change course, we must confront and overturn some of the core assumptions held by European elites: the belief in universal human fungibility, the myth of purely economic rationality, and the notion that civilization can persist without continuity of its people.
Because in the end, there will be nothing left to integrate if there are no Europeans left to be integrated and united.
https://x.com/BirthGauge/status/1940492609614762382?t=_17y7_03cdntOoj22X0Efw&s=19
It is absolutely impossible that birth stats are not correct in developed countries.
That's an act of faith.
Below there are the other two parts of this essay; first of all, Europe is not a country and the Comission is not a government. The EU is a platform to run mostly tecnhnical consensual policies. Additionally, given out parlamentary sistems, the New Rigth already influences and will never rule Europe.
Finally, our Muslim population is smaller than that of Russia and Israel, and fertility rates show that everybody everywhere (Muslim countries too) is westernizing, perhaps even too much.
Yout comment looks like antisemitic disinformation. More likely wrote from Teherán (perhaps Moscow) than from Tel Aviv. You foul nobody here. The Muslim fertility-Mein Kampf comment is totally anti kosher.